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ADJUSTMENT OF MAINTENANCE APPROACH FOR IMPROVED 
OPERABILITY AND SAFETY OF SHIP NAVIGATION
ABSTRACT
By adjusting the maintenance approach towards the 
significant components of ship’s engines and equipment, 
through the use of operational data from the ship machin-
ery’s daily reports, higher operability and navigation safety 
can be achieved. The proposed maintenance adjustment 
model consists of an operation data analysis and risk analy-
sis. The risk analysis comprises the definition of the upper 
and the lower risk criterion, as well as the definition of a risk 
index. If the risk index is higher than the lower risk criterion, 
the component is significant, while it is not significant and 
has an acceptable risk index if the risk index is lower than 
the lower risk criterion. For each significant component with 
a risk index found to be “unacceptable” or “undesirable”, an 
efficient maintenance policy needs to be adopted. The as-
sessment of the proposed model is based on data regarding 
the power engine original operation throughout a 13-year 
period. The results of engine failure examinations reveal that 
the exhaust valve is the most vulnerable component with the 
highest rate of failure. For this reason the proposed model 
of adjusting the maintenance approach has been tested on 
the exhaust valve sample. It is suggested that the efforts to 
achieve higher ship operability and navigation safety should 
go in the direction of periodical adjustments of the main-
tenance approach i.e. choosing an efficient maintenance 
policy by reducing the risk indices of the significant engine 
components.
KEY WORDS
maintenance adjustment approach, risk analysis, risk index, 
lower risk criterion, upper risk criterion, significant compo-
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ships that are designed and built to satisfy the 
classification rules and the IMO regulations have an 
acceptable level of reliability for safe navigation. Un-
planned intermissions and engine failures that can 
result from inadequate maintenance may cause ad-
ditional costs (ships are not in operation for a certain 
period of time). Every hour of intermission brings high 
expenses to the ship-owner and the maintenance ex-
perts’ task is to do their best to avoid the unplanned 
intermission or to reduce its duration. Since the loss of 
ship propulsion, even for a short time, must be avoid-
ed, ship-owners use more rigorous, redundant designs 
to reduce that risk. This leads to increasing the costs 
of the ship’s life cycle.
To enhance the operability and safety of navigation 
it is necessary to reduce the risk of the failure-effect 
on the significant machinery components. The main-
tenance approach by timing which is generally used 
aboard ships does not represent the most efficient 
maintenance approach. By adjusting the maintenance 
approach to increase the operability and safety of navi-
gation, the suggested producers intervals can be mod-
ified because of certain factors that influence the state 
and performance of a component. Adjustment of the 
maintenance approach of the most significant com-
ponents based on the real operational data is more 
reliable than the design of the initial maintenance con-
cept for a new ship.
2. ADJUSTMENT OF THE 
MAINTENANCE APPROACH
The model for the adjustment of the maintenance 
approach with the aim of decreasing the risk index of 
the significant components of the propulsion engine is 
shown in Figure 1. It is carried out in two phases:
1. Ship – the machinery behaviour is recorded and 
a database is created. Daily propulsion reports are 
registered in the log book during 24 hours. Data on 
failures and maintenance operations are recorded, as 
well as the duration of the intermission period.
2. Office – the database is used, data analysis is 
performed and the maintenance approach is adjusted.
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2.1 Operation data analysis – the work time, inter-
mission, maintenance, failure distribution and failure 
rate are displayed. Within the identified components 
in the failure mode analysis the significant modes and 
failure effects are identified. For the given component 
samples, along with the parameters of position (t0), 
shape (b ) and the Weibull distribution rate (h), the pre-
dictability of the failure (p) is defined. The preventive 
maintenance interval equals the sum of position and 
rate parameters (t0 h+ ) for the analyzed components. 
The parameter t0is either the threshold parameter, the 
guarantee time or the minimum life of the component. 
Predictions of the minimal life can be obtained by in-
terviewing the experts. However, since occasional fail-
ures occur during the whole work cycle of the system, 
and the experts’ answers are mostly uncertain, it is 
safe to conclude that in the case of older machinery 
t 00 = . In such a case, the Weibull distribution has two 
parameters ( ,W h b^ h) and the ratio’s parameter repre-
sents the preventive maintenance interval (h = mean 
life).
2.2 Risk analysis – comprises the definition of the 
URC (Upper Risk Criterion) and LRC (Lower Risk Crite-
rion), as well as the RI (Risk Index). Risk can be defined 
as the expected loss, connected with the occurrence 
of an undesirable event, i.e. it is mathematically the 
“probability of x consequences”. The consequence (ex-
pected loss) is expressed in terms of SI (Significance 
Index), whereas the probability (expected event) is ex-
pressed by the ELFF (Expected Life Failure Frequency) 
[1].
The risk index is defined by the product of the sig-
nificance index and the expected life failure frequency.
RI SI ELFF$= . (1)
There are two categories of significance: safety and 
operation.
The safety risk index:
RI s SI s ELFF$=^ ^h h . (2)
The operation risk index:
RI o SI o ELFF$=^ ^h h . (3)
The significance index SI shows the magnitude of 
the expected loss which is connected with an undesir-
able event. The index shows the significance on the 
scale (0 1" ). Unit (1) represents disaster, while zero 
(0) means an effect without significance (Table 1).
The Expected Life Failure Frequency (ELFF) rep-
resents the expected number of failures that will be 
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In the case of MTTF (Mean Time to Failure) being 
much shorter than the component’s life L (MTTF << L), 
one can estimate that:
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The installed component is in use until failure oc-
curs, and is then regenerated. The condition after the 
regeneration is considered as new.
The aim of the risk index is to define equal risk ef-
fects with regards to safety and the operation. These 
are the URC and LRC curves that connect the points of 
equal risk and determine the acceptable, undesirable 
and unacceptable zones of risk index (Figure 2).
Depending on the consequences of the failure, 
the components may be significant or non-significant. 
The lower risk criterion (LRC) separates the significant 
components from the non-significant ones and is one 
hundred times more reliable than the upper risk crite-
rion (URC = 100 LRC). The significant components are 
Table 1 - The significance index [1]
Class Magnitude SI Possible failure effects
Safety
catastrophic 1 loss of ship, environmental catastrophe
critical 0.1 critical injury, major ship damage
severe 0.01 minor injury, damage to ship, secondary damage
marginal 0.001 possible injury, possible damage to ship
negligible < 0.0001 no injury, no possible damage to ship
Operation
not available 0.01 the ship is unavailable for operation during some days
partially available 0.001 the ship is unavailable for operation during some hours
reduced performance 0.0001 the ship operates with reduced performance
available < 0.00001 the ship is fully operational
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Figure 1 - Model for maintenance approach adjustment
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those that have significant influence on the safety or 
the operation (or the price of repair), so their risk index 
may be undesirable or unacceptable. In the significant 
component there is at least one failure combination 
of mode/cause, whose safety or operation risk index 
is higher than LRC. On the other hand, in the non-sig-
nificant or safe component the risk index is below LRC 
and that risk index is acceptable.
Once the functional failure appears, its effects al-
ways have the same meaning. The reduction of the risk 
index may be achieved by the adjustment of the main-
tenance approach or by a modification of the installed 
component. The maintenance can affect the failure 
frequency; however, it cannot change the significance 
of the failure effect. In other words, the maintenance 
actions reduce the risk index by reducing ELFF. In the 
figure it is shown by direction 2.
The significance of the failure effect may be re-
duced by a modification of the installed component. 
A change in the installed component geometry alters 
the behaviour of the failure, which can lead to a dif-
ferent failure effect and a different significance. This 
is shown in Figure 2 by direction 1 (significance reduc-
tion). The combination of 1 & 2 is also possible.
For each significant component identified in the 
risk analysis an efficient maintenance policy must 
be chosen. For the failure modes effects having the 
risk index in an unacceptable zone, preventive main-
tenance (PM) could be required to reduce the risk. If 
that is not possible, a modification will be required. 
The components with the risk index within the accept-
able zone will be given the corrective maintenance 
(CM). When the risk index is undesirable, corrective 
maintenance must be considered as a possibility of 
an efficient maintenance policy. Later on, during the 
optimization of the costs, it will be decided whether 
the CM can be applied (in case the CM costs are lower 
than the PM costs).
If the risk index is unacceptable, preventive main-
tenance is not suitable. The risk index can be reduced 
to an acceptable level by a mere modification, thus re-
ducing both the significance and the risk index.
Predictability (p) in risk analysis shows whether 
the failure behaviour is suitable for control by means 
of periodical actions. The predictability indicates the 
possibility of foreseeing the time between the failure 
(TBF) and the time to failure (TTF). According to [1], if 
the failure rate is decreasing (DFR – decreasing failure 
rate) or constant (CFR – constant failure rate), the pre-
dictability equals zero (p 0= , 1#b  and t 00 = ). In 
such cases the periodical maintenance is inefficient. 
Moreover, if the predictability is low ( .p0 0 51 # , 
1 21 1b , and t 00 = ), periodical preventive mainte-
nance may be taken into consideration, but an “on-
condition PM” is more desirable. A periodical PM is se-
lected in the case of high predictability ( . p0 5 1# # ,
2$b  and t 00 = ), when a significant increasing fail-
ure rate (IFR) is present. Evidence (e) and time of re-
action (r) in the selected maintenance approach for 
the significant component will determine the decision 
regarding the “on-condition PM” approach. Evidence 
(e) shows whether the operator may notice the dete-
rioration development [1]. If so, the time of reaction 
is used as a second criterion. If the time of reaction is 
zero or very short (totally unexpected or almost totally 
unexpected failure) the “on-condition PM” option will 
be rejected.
3. POWER ENGINE FAILURES
The paper [2] presents the research of power en-
gine failures, based on original data from the power 
engine daily reports during a 13-year period. The pow-
er engine is a MAN 7L Diesel engine of 400/500 pow-
er 2200kW (3000hp), a 400mm cylinder diameter, 
number of cylinders 7 and a piston stroke of 540mm 
[3]. The engine daily reports were registered in the 
log book [4], which was kept every day from 00 to 24 
hours either during navigation or the stay in the port.
Data analysis comprises 61,600 operative hours of 
the power engine [2]. During the 13-year period the 
total number of intermissions was 155 and the total 
intermission time ≈ 386 hours, i.e. approximately 2.5 
hours per intermission. The exhaust valve, the injector 
valve and the fuel oil pump (high pressure pipe) are 
the components with the highest number of intermis-
sions. The injector valve had the highest number of re-
placements with an average replacement time of 0.5 
hours, followed by the exhaust valve with an average 
replacement time of 2.5 hours.
From a total of 65 intermission notes regarding fail-








1 - reduction SI
2 - reduction ELFF
1&
2
Figure 2 - Domain risk index [1]
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state have been recorded, which proves that the injec-
tor valve was replaced preventively. From 62 replace-
ments of the exhaust valves (in couple), 30 failures 
were registered (combustion, blow-out, erosion, leak-
age, deposits), which accounts for approximately 50% 
of the cases. Valve combustion was the most frequent 
failure (19 cases), followed by valve bursting (5).
Total failure rate of the power engine is 
.1 2822 10 3$m = -  [hour-1] and it is approximately 
22.8% higher than that registered for the Japanese 
power engines, where it is . 100 989 3$=m -  [hour-1] 
according to the SRIC (Ship Reliability Investigation 
Committee) [5,6]. SRIC has made a study covering 
231 ships in the 13-year period.
The highest failure rate was found for the exhaust 
valve, which amounted to . 100 4870 3$=m - , while, 
according to the SRIC, it was . 100 4218 3$=m -  (ex-
haust valves, fuel oil pump). As far as data integrity is 
concerned in the study, the exhaust valve is the most 
accurately described of all the analysed components. 
The results of the exhaust valve sample are shown 
in Table 2. The position parameter t 00 =  means 
that the failures are possible after the installation of 
the exhaust valve. The maintenance interval for the 
whole exhaust valve is 3333h =  hours, whereas it is 
3447h =  hours for the valve and the valve seat. The 
predictability of failure for the valve and the valve seat 
is .p 0 51=  (51%). It is a case of high predictability 
( 2$b , .p 0 52 and t 00 = ), when the exhaust valve 
indicates significant IFR.
According to [2], the exhaust valve FMCC has a very 
clear basic failure effect (spindle malfunction & ex-
haust valve failure & accelerated deterioration of the 
valve seat). Hence, the valve and the valve seat show 
the failure effect: “no closure”, which results in “bad 
combustion and decrease in cylinder power”.
4. DETERMINATION OF UPPER 
AND LOWER RISK CRITERIA
The fault tree analysis is the basic method for the 
analysis of safety systems. The analysis starts with de-
fining the undesirable event, then proceeds towards 
the bottom in order to find the failure of the system 
elements that might cause the undesirable event. The 
undesirable or the so-called top event will be the loss 
of the ship (SI = 1), and the events at the bottom are 
the FMCCs with the critical failure effects. The proba-
bility of the ship loss due to a propulsion engine failure 
is obtained from the expression
.F L e e1 1 0 0198.AFR L 0 001 20= - = - =$ $- -^ h , (8)
where AFR is the Average Failure Rate of the compo-
nent ( . . .AFR 0 0028 0 36 0 001$ ,=  per year) and L is 
the lifetime of the ship (L 20=  years). The average 
total loss amounts to 0.28% of the world’s shipping 
tonnage [7], and according to [8] 36% of the failures 
are caused by the propulsion engines.
Two events in the failure tree analysis may lead to 
ship loss (Figure 3):
1. Fire or explosion, an event caused by a technical 
failure of the propulsion engine, including the possibil-
ity of firing mechanisms. Firing is possible only if the 
components are in operation (estimated at 75%) and 
if the leakage of fuel oil or lubricant occurs.
The leakage of fuel oil in the propulsion engine can 
occur either on the fuel system or on the lubrication 
system. Leakage on the fuel system can occur on the 
high-pressure pipe or on the injector valve. Analysing 
the data published in [2] and consulting the experts, it 
can be concluded that the fuel oil leakage on the high 
pressure pipe can occur due to a failure of the non-
return valve, the piston or the juncture with the high 
pressure pipe. On the injector valve the fuel leakage 
may occur on the juncture of the fuel high pressure 
pipe or due to a needle malfunction. Furthermore, 
from the examination of failures on the propulsion en-
gine type MAN 7L 400/500 three possible cases of 
leakage on the lubrication system were noted. These 
are the failures at 457882, 724463 and 762564 hours 
of engine work, where condition “leakage” was record-
ed. The fuel or lubricant leakage will only be critical if it 
leaks onto a hot surface. The estimated probability of 
that being the case is 0.01.
From the above mentioned analysis it arises that 
there are five critical FMCCs on the fuel oil system per 
cylinder and 35 FMCCs on the propulsion engine fuel 
system. Adding to this number the three cases of the 
lubrication system, there are a total number of 38 criti-
cal propulsion engine FMCCs.
2. Functional loss in critical conditions is the 
case of steering loss, with two critical FMCCs: one 
for the steering gear and the other for the rudder. In 
the case of critical conditions, weather accounts for 
an average loss of 2.6%, a ship wreckage for 9.3% 
and collisions for 8.7% of losses, while the aver-
age annual loss of the world shipping tonnage is 
0.28% (weather . . .0 0028 0 026 0 00007$ = , ship 
wreckage . . .0 0028 0 093 0 00026$ ,  and collision 
. . .0 0028 0 087 0 00024$ , ) [7].
Table 2 - Results of the exhaust valve sample [2]
FMCC1 Component Failure mode/cause b t0 h MTBF Predictability p
(1) Exhaust valve (complete) Wear/usage 2 0 3333 2943 0.46
(16) Valve and valve seat Valve burned out/usage 2.23 0 3447 3046 0.51
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The logical “and” is calculated as a cross-section 
probability, while the “or” is estimated as the union 
of the event probability. For parallel events, the “or” 
members corresponding to the cross-section are not 
considered in the estimate of probability of the fault 
tree analysis because they are small in size. By ne-
glecting these members the result of the analysis 
gives a somewhat higher value of the event probabil-
ity in the catastrophe tree. The seeking value ELFF of 
the catastrophic events (SI 1= ) for the bottom level is 
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Value .x 0 07. , obtained from the equation is the 
DLFF of the catastrophic event. It is used for determin-
ing the upper and lower criterion of the risk index.
The upper risk criterion for SI 1=  is:
. .URC ELFF SI 0 07 1 0 07$ $= = =  (11)
The URC explains that the critical FMCC must have 
an average failure rate smaller than 0.07 per year or 
8 10 6$. -  per hour.
This criterion is now estimated for the less signifi-
cant events (reduced performance – without dam-
age to the ship or the environment). In that case 





0 07 700= = =  (12)
Equation (12) shows the limit value of a non ac-
ceptable risk, obtained for the FMCCs with the failure 
effects of the reduced performance. The less signifi-
cant failure effect is non acceptable if it occurs more 
than 700 times during the planned lifetime. This is 
more than 35 times per year or 3 times per month.
The lower risk criterion separates the significant 
components from the non significant ones and is one 
hundred times more reliable than the URC, which 
means:
.LRC URC100 0 0007= =  (13)
It follows that:
 upper risk criterion URC 7 10 2$= - – 
    – unacceptable / undesirable
 lower risk criterion LRC 7 10 4$= - – 













































Leak in lubrication system
FMCC x 3
Figure 3 - Failure tree
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5. MAINTENANCE ADJUSTMENT 
APPROACH FOR THE EXHAUST VALVE
Since the exhaust valve is the most vulnerable pro-
pulsion engine component with the highest failure fre-
quency, the proposed adjustment model for the main-
tenance approach will be shown on the exhaust valve 
sample.
As the exhaust valve is significant in terms of safety 
and operation, it is necessary to define the significance 
indices of safety and operation. The operation signifi-
cance indices of the exhaust valve are .SI o 0 001=^ h
because the failure effects include the unavailability of 
the ship during a few hours (Table 1). As far as safety 
is concerned, its significance index is .SI s 0 0001=^ h  
(with no accident and no damage to ship or environ-
ment).
The failure frequency in the life of the ELFF com-
ponent will be obtained following the expression (6) 
if the component’s lifetime is divided by the average 
time between the MTBF failures according to Table 2. 
The lifetime of the valve is 75,000 hours (twice recon-
ditioned). The valve and the valve seat failed 24 times 
and the complete exhaust valve 25 times during the 
planned operation period. The results of risk analysis 
are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
According to Figure 4 the exhaust valve risk index 
is in the undesirable region (RI undesirable). It means 
that the exhaust valve is a significant component, 
having two failure mode combinations with the risk 
indices (safety and operation) higher than the LRC. 
According to the model, when risk index is in the un-
desirable zone, a CM is added as a possible efficient 
maintenance approach.
In the case of the mentioned exhaust valve, be-
cause of its high predictability ( .p 0 51= , .2 23b =  
and t 00 = ), the preventive periodical maintenance 
with the maintenance interval shifted to 3500 hours 
( 3447h =  hours, Table 2) is strongly advised. On the 
other hand, the maintenance interval (opening, repair-
ing and assembling all exhaust valves) for the expect-
ing wear-out of the exhaust valve is planned according 
to [3] every 5000 hours.
Evidence (e) (noticing a deterioration) is the main 
indicator of whether to apply inspections or continued 
monitoring. As a potential failure can be noticed only 
by disassembling and examining the valve, it is nec-
essary to opt for inspection (I). The reaction time (r) 
is the average time between potential and functional 
failure. According to the interviews with experts it has 
been estimated that the reaction time for the exhaust 
valve is between 5 and 50 hours [2]. The reaction time 
is acceptable since it is long enough to enable main-
tenance action at the moment when it is necessary. 
The result of the maintenance adjustment approach 
for the exhaust valve in order to reduce its risk index by 
reducing the ELFF is presented in Table 4.
6. CONCLUSION
Longer and safer navigation is achieved with the 
adjustment of maintenance approach for the signifi-
cant components, i.e. by choosing an efficient main-
tenance policy by reducing the failure frequency in the 
component lifetime or by a modification: decrease of 
significance of the failure effect on safety and opera-
tion.
The results of the analysis of the propulsion en-
gine failures have shown that most failures occurred 
on the injection valve and the exhaust valve. The most 
vulnerable propulsion engine component is the ex-
Table 3 - Results of exhaust valve risk index
FMCC Component SI s^ h SI o^ h ELFF RI s^ h RI o^ h
(1) Exhaust valve (complete) 0.0001 0.001 25.5 0.00255 0.0255
(16) Valve and valve seat 0.0001 0.001 24.6 0.00246 0.0246
Table 4 - Results of exhaust valve maintenance approach adjustment
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Figure 4 - Graphic survey of exhaust valve risk index
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haust valve with the highest failure rate, and the most 
common failure mode is the valve and the valve seat 
burning. Through the analysis the propulsion engine 
failures, using the fault tree analysis, where the top 
event is the ship loss and the events at the bottom 
are the failure modes with the critical failure effects, 
it is possible to define the upper risk criterion. The 
lower risk criterion is one hundred times more reliable 
than the upper risk criterion. The upper and lower risk 
index criteria are the curves which determine the ac-
ceptable, undesirable and unacceptable region of risk 
index. The exhaust valve is a significant component 
since its risk index is higher than the lower risk crite-
rion and is situated in the undesirable region. It has 
a significant basic failure effect (spindle malfunction 
& exhaust valve failure & accelerated deterioration 
of the valve seat) and consequently “bad combus-
tion and decrease in cylinder power”. According to the 
proposed model for adjustment of the maintenance 
approach of the exhaust valve by reducing the risk 
index decreasing the failure frequency in the compo-
nent’s lifetime, the preventive periodical maintenance 
and on-condition maintenance should be requested. 
Because of high predictability of the exhaust valve, 
preventive periodical maintenance is highly desirable, 
applying the mentioned maintenance at shorter inter-
vals than suggested by the manufacturer and with an 
on-condition maintenance (inspection) and an accept-
able reaction time. However, after a certain period of 
time it is necessary to repeat the cycle of adjustment 
of the maintenance approach for the exhaust valve 
and to compare the results (maintenance intervals, 
failure predictability, risk indices and the choice of 
maintenance approach).
The efforts for higher operability and navigation 
safety should move in the direction of periodic main-
tenance adjustment by choosing an efficient mainte-
nance policy by reducing the risk indices of the signifi-
cant ship engine and equipment components, using 
the operation data from the ship machinery daily re-
ports. A periodic adjustment of the maintenance ap-
proach contributes to reducing costs in the ship’s life 
cycle.
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SAŽETAK
PODEŠAVANJE PRISTUPA ODRŽAVANJA 
U SVRHU POVEĆANJA OPERATIVNOSTI I 
SIGURNOSTI PLOVIDBE BRODOM
Podešavanjem pristupa održavanja značajnih kompo-
nenti brodskih strojeva i uređaja koristeći eksploatacijske 
podatke iz dnevnih izvještaja brodskog pogona postiže se 
veća operativnost i sigurnost plovidbe brodom. Predloženi 
model podešavanja pristupa održavanja sastoji se od ana-
lize operativnih podataka i analize rizika. Analiza rizika 
obuhvaća definiranje gornjeg i donjeg kriterija rizika i in-
deksa rizika. Ako je indeks rizika veći od kriterija donjeg 
rizika komponenta je značajna, odnosno, ako je indeks rizika 
manji od kriterija donjeg rizika komponenta je neznačajna i 
ima prihvatljiv indeks rizika. Za svaku značajnu komponentu 
koja ima indeks rizika „nepoželjan“ ili „neprihvatljiv“ bira se 
efikasna politika održavanja. Verifikacija predloženog mod-
ela podešavanja pristupa održavanja temelji se na izvornim 
operativnim podacima porivnog stroja iz trinaestgodišnjeg 
vremenskog razdoblja. Rezultati istraživanja analize kvarova 
porivnog stroja pokazuje da je ispušni ventil najugroženija 
komponenta s najvećom stopom kvara. Upravo zbog toga 
predloženi model podešavanja pristupa održavanja je veri-
ficiran na uzorku ispušnog ventila. Predlaže se da nastojanja 
za veću operativnost i sigurnost plovidbe brodom moraju ići 
u smjeru povremenog podešavanja pristupa održavanja tj. 
izborom efikasne politike održavanja smanjenjem indeksa 
rizika značajnih komponenti brodskog pogona.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI
podešavanje pristupa održavanja, analiza rizika, indeks 
rizika, kriterij donjeg rizika, kriterij gornjeg rizika, značajne 
komponente, plovidba brodom
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The exhaust valve failure mode can be the result of 
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2. Cracking of the lubricating pipe TC (turbocharger).
3. Oil leakage into the rocker arm lubricating system.
4. Cracking the gasket in the oil pump pressure pipe.
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